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Capital, Collective Action, and Residential 
Income Segregation 
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Abstract 
Social capital is presumed to help individuals who lack financial or human capital achieve collective action 
through their social ties and networks of relationships. But does it help individuals overcome their 
socioeconomic disadvantages relative to their wealthier neighbors, or does the accumulation of social capital 
merely reproduce socioeconomic disparities, particularly in economically segregated places? Leveraging data 
from the Current Population Survey, I test whether residential income segregation is associated with larger 
income differences in social capital investments and collective action. I find that in more economically 
segregated places, wealthier residents are more likely to be members of neighborhood organizations and report 
working with other community members to address local issues. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
other potential confounders, including income inequality, racial context, and racial residential segregation. This 
research has implications for policy makers and stakeholders interested in building a more inclusive civic arena. 
Keywords residential segregation, social capital, civic engagement, collective action, income inequality 
Scholars have theorized that social capital is the “main weapon of the have-nots,” presumed to help individuals 
and groups who lack significant financial or human capital achieve better outcomes through their social ties and 
networks of relationships (Putnam 2001, p. 359). Others, however, raise serious doubts about whether social 
capital can help individuals overcome their socioeconomic disadvantages relative to their more resource-rich 
neighbors, noting that investments in social capital often reproduce disparities in political voice and power 
(DeFilippis 2001; Wacquant 1998). In this article, I approach this debate by integrating two strands in the 
literature—one focused on individual difference and the other on contextual influence—to test whether 
residential income segregation conditions the social capital investments of the rich and poor. My theoretical 
argument draws upon Bourdieu’s (1986, p. 46) key insight that capital accumulation is structured by macro-level 
constraints that shape “the chances of success for practice.” I argue that the spatial segregation of poverty and 
affluence limits opportunities for the poor to form social networks endowed with substantial resources and 
reduces their perceptions that social capital can overcome socioeconomic disadvantage. Such spatial 
segregation may also create a virtuous circle for the well-off, producing additional positive returns to their social 
capital investments. Thus, as the number of mixed-income neighborhoods declines, the information, support, 
and influence that flow through social networks may be further confined to a smaller number of places, thereby 
exacerbating the social isolation and political marginalization of the poor. 
Although social capital remains a contested concept (Woolcock 2011), I hope to recover some of its utility for 
the study of local politics. Indeed, social capital theory has all but been abandoned by political scientists, as 
noted by Hero and Orr (2012, p. 311) in their review of the literature: 
Unless it is modified, social capital does not fit with much of the reigning approach to urban political 
science—the urban political economy approach. This approach focuses on the interplay between polity 
and the economy at the local level and its consequences for public policy. The political arena is an 
important component of the urban political economy perspective. Social capital, on the other hand, is 
centered more in the civic arena. 
 
And yet, while the economy plays a key role in shaping and constraining local political conflict and the policy 
agendas that cities pursue, the civic sector remains on the frontlines of local policy development and 
implementation. Government contracting with nonprofit organizations has increased dramatically, blurring the 
line between public and private action (Smith and Lipsky 2009). Locally elected officials have supported 
devolution as well, reaping political benefits for directing resources to their constituents (Marwell 2007). Many 
cities are now experimenting with localism and coproduction (Fung 2009; Fung and Wright 2003; John 2009). 
And as the allegiance of businesses to particular places wanes, universities, foundations, and hospitals have 
joined—and sometimes replaced—the downtown elite in shaping the urban agenda (Stone 2013). In turn, 
political opportunity structures within cities look different than they did 50 years ago: Coalitions among elites 
are more unstable, resources are more limited, and nonelite actors have greater access to political decision-
making power (Stone 2015). 
But while participatory programs may help citizens get their issues onto the public agenda (Berry, Portney, and 
Thomson 1993), individuals with substantial social capital are often better prepared to take advantage of such 
decentralizing reforms (Fung 2009; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). And although recent research illustrates 
how marginalized groups—led by nonprofit organizations, neighborhood associations, and labor and immigrant 
groups—can mobilize resources to shape alternative agendas for city politics (see, for example, Jones-Correa 
and Wong 2015), no study to date has systematically measured income biases in social capital and collective 
action, or the geographic variation in such disparities. 
Indeed, whether local contexts exacerbate socioeconomic differences in social capital investments has particular 
relevance given the substantial increase in the spatial segregation of poverty and affluence within metropolitan 
regions. Since 1970, the share of the population who live in the poorest and most affluent neighborhoods has 
doubled (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). Middle-class neighborhoods have shrunk in 27 out of the largest 30 
metropolitan areas (Fry and Taylor 2012), and significant pockets of poverty now dot many inner-ring suburbs 
(Kneebone and Berube 2013). These trends stand in contrast to racial residential segregation, which has 
declined since the 1970s (Massey, Rothwell, and Domina 2009). Although some have noted that social capital 
tends to be organized along the same fault lines—race, ethnicity, gender, and social class—that structure other 
forms of social participation (see, for example, Briggs 1997; DeFilippis 2001; Lin 2000; Wacquant 1998), there is 
little empirical evidence on how neatly socioeconomic disparities map onto inequalities in social capital 
investments and collective action, or whether residential income segregation exacerbates these gaps. 
There are good reasons to suspect that residential income segregation limits opportunities for the poor to build 
the sorts of productive social networks that can be leveraged to gain access to better resources and influence 
policy makers. Studies of Chicago (Wilson 1987) and Detroit (Cohen and Dawson 1993) illustrate how 
concentrations of urban poverty create a vicious cycle of social isolation and political marginalization. Other 
research finds that residential characteristics—including racial homogeneity (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Costa 
and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Putnam 2007) and income inequality (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999)—shape 
individuals’ propensities to participate in civic life. But whether there are places where typically marginalized 
residents are not at such a disadvantage when it comes to the cooperative networks that help individuals work 
together to achieve social ends is unclear. 
To address these questions, I take advantage of data in the Current Population Survey (CPS) civic and volunteer 
supplements, collected jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics (Flood et al. 2015). I first 
aggregate these data by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) to examine geographic variation in income biases in 
social capital investments and collective action. I then estimate a series of multilevel models that take into 
account individual-level resource differences as well as the differences across MSAs on such factors as income 
segregation, poverty, income inequality, and racial segregation. In brief, I find that income biases in social capital 
and collective action are increasing with residential income segregation. These results are robust to the inclusion 
of other potential confounders, including income inequality, racial context, and racial residential segregation. 
These findings provide additional evidence for how income segregation negatively impacts the life outcomes of 
the poor and suggest that efforts to build local civic capacity must first work to bridge the income divide in civic 
life. 
Income Biases in Social Capital and Collective Action 
In examining income biases in social capital, I rely upon Bourdieu’s (1986, p. 51) conception of social capital as 
the resources that can be gained through “relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” Portes (1998, 
p. 121) similarly defined social capital as the “capacity for individuals to command scarce resources by virtue of 
their membership in networks of broader social structures” (see also Coleman 1988; Lin 2000). Although these 
relationships provide resources that can be leveraged for action, social capital can take on many different forms. 
It can include the close-knit and intensive networks that can help people get by, or what some have called 
“bonding” social capital (Putnam 2001). It can play a more “bridging” role, providing the weak links (Granovetter 
1973) that can help less advantaged individuals get ahead and the diffuse networks that can enable them to gain 
sustained access to formal institutions (Woolcock 2011). At minimum, however, social capital refers to 
relationships that “enable people to acquire resources” (Van Eijk 2010, p. 57). These resources might include 
information, social support, skills, norms, trust, influence, or capital, but it is the acquiring and exchanging of 
resources through social ties that gives conceptual clarity to the term. 
Putnam (2001) argued that because social capital facilitates collective action, the benefits of generalized trust 
and norms of reciprocity accrue to communities as well.1 Consistent with this logic, places endowed with greater 
stocks of social capital appear to be better equipped to confront their economic difficulties (Briggs 2008; see 
also Kawachi, Kennedy, and Glass 1999).2 
Yet if social capital is related to community well-being and critical for making decentralizing reforms work (Briggs 
1997), local contexts also matter. For example, participation in associational activities tends to be lower in more 
diverse (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Putnam 2007) and unequal (Alesina, Baqir, 
and Easterly 1999) places. Much of this work, however, does not consider how the amount and types of social 
capital possessed by individuals vary by socioeconomic status (SES). This is somewhat surprising given 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on power, prestige, and the ways in which social relations can reproduce inequality. Nor is 
there much research on how socioeconomic disparities in social capital investments differ across 
communities. Small (2010, p. 9) noted that “in their devotion to studying the consequences of social ties, many 
researchers have taken for granted the processes by which they arise.”. 
Previous research suggests two processes that shape social capital disparities. The first centers on how social 
stratification affects perceptions of investment returns. For example, disadvantaged youth living in states with 
larger income gaps between the poor and middle class appear to see less value in investing in their human 
capital, helping to explain the negative correlation between state-level income inequality and educational 
attainment (Kearney and Levine 2014). Social capital investments may similarly be conditioned by perceptions of 
success (Bourdieu 1986). Higher SES individuals likely see more evidence of successful networking, which in turn 
may help to reinforce prosocial norms among the well-off. And because of their close social and geographic 
proximity to resource-rich networks, it takes less time, fewer resources, and not as much motivation to form 
useful social ties. Marginalized groups, however, have fewer opportunities to build cross-group ties, see fewer 
examples of socioeconomic advancement through social connection, and must expend more resources—group 
identity, recognition from group peers, opportunity costs—to access better networks with more information and 
influence (Lin 2000). A second process centers on social position. Given that individuals tend to associate with 
similar others, income biases in social capital investments may arise through the unintentional accumulation of 
resources that are embedded in social structures. Both processes predict large socioeconomic disparities in 
social capital accumulation. 
That said, many low-income residents in resource-poor neighborhoods have rich social connections, even if they 
lack more formal relationships to community-based organizations (CBOs; see, for example, Venkatesh 
2009).3 Poor and marginalized residents often rely on dense networks of mutual support to get by (Saegert, 
Thompson, and Warren 2002; Stack 1974), and poor neighborhoods do not necessarily restrict the resources 
embedded within social networks. Small’s (2004) qualitative study of Boston’s neighborhoods suggests three 
sources of difference: (1) availability of resources within the neighborhood, (2) ethnic and class composition, 
and (3) the quality of boundaries between poor households and surrounding nonpoor ones. Scholars have 
largely focused on the first two sources. For example, several studies examine neighborhood differences in 
organizational resources (Berry, Portney, and Thomson 1993; Sampson 2012; Small 2004). Finding that 
neighborhood well-being in Chicago can be explained in part by the strength of its local institutions, including 
the nonprofit organizations and churches that help to facilitate civic action, Sampson (2012, p. 371) summarized 
much of this literature by noting that “communities possessing a rich organizational life are ahead of the curve.” 
Other studies that examine contextual variation focus on how racial diversity shapes racial and ethnic group 
differences in social capital (see, for example, Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Putnam 
2007). The literature has paid much less attention to the spatial proximities and hierarchies that structure social 
and civic life (but see Sampson 2012). 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to suspect that the spatial segregation of poverty and affluence 
perpetuates social isolation and marginalization, thereby weakening social bonds and civic capacities, 
particularly within poor neighborhoods. Wilson’s (1987) seminal work on urban poverty shows how 
deindustrialization and the subsequent flight of middle-income residents from inner-city neighborhoods cut the 
poor off from more resource-rich networks. The consequences of such social isolation are profound: Individuals 
lacking these kinds of social connections are more likely to be disconnected from labor markets and informal 
“protection” networks (Granovetter 1973). Social isolation can also reinforce political disadvantages. Drawing on 
public opinion data from Detroit residents, Cohen and Dawson (1993) showed that low-income individuals living 
in high-poverty neighborhoods vote and participate in community meetings at lower rates than similarly poor 
residents living in more economically diverse neighborhoods. Thus, while dense networks of mutual support are 
found in many resource-poor neighborhoods, residential income segregation may shape the types of social ties 
that are formed and whether those social connections encourage civic involvement. 
Public institutions such as schools and welfare agencies—themselves constituting a formal source of social 
capital (Wacquant 1998)—also function very differently in the context of extreme segregation and concentrated 
poverty. Wacquant (1998, p. 35) argued, 
Instead of forming a protective buffer and a panoply of mechanisms likely to prop up the most 
vulnerable members and tie them into the national collectivity, the public institutions of today’s ghetto . 
. . serve to further isolate, stigmatize, and exclude them. 
 
Several studies illustrate how geographically confined spaces of community supervision and criminal 
justice interaction can reduce the political and civic engagement of entire neighborhoods (Burch 
2013; Lerman and Weaver 2014). Residential income segregation may also produce highly segregated school 
districts, with struggling schools that contribute little social capital concentrated in poor neighborhoods 
and resource-rich schools far removed from where the poor live. 
 
Likewise, residential income segregation may reduce the amount of social capital that gets mediated through 
CBOs. Because social capital is often produced by brokers who able are to stitch together nonoverlapping 
networks (Burt 2004), the nonprofit sector plays an important role in generating social capital (Small 2009). Yet 
though the nonprofit sector is an important intermediary, many organizations locate in nonpoor areas (Allard 
2008), thus creating additional geographic disadvantages for low-income residents. Such spatial mismatches 
may become even more pronounced as poverty increasingly becomes a suburban issue (Kneebone and Berube 
2013). 
At the other end of the socioeconomic ladder, income segregation may lead to even greater social capital 
investments among the well-off. A substantial body of literature demonstrates that social ties are more easily 
formed and maintained in homogeneous communities (see, for example, Hero 2003; Putnam 2007). The spatial 
segregation of affluence may mean that it is easier for the advantaged not only to form productive social ties but 
also to reap greater returns from a resource-rich network. Geographic concentrations of affluence may also 
restrict the amount of human and social capital, political influence, and instrumental resources that spills over 
onto poor and middle-class communities (Bischoff and Reardon 2014). 
But while U.S. cities have become increasingly unequal places to live, particularly as housing and land-use 
policies continue to create segregated spaces of economic opportunity (Hayward and Swanstrom 2011), metro 
areas differ substantively from one another in terms of income inequality (Berube 2014) and residential income 
segregation (Reardon and Bischoff 2011). And although income inequality and income segregation are 
correlated, income inequality is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for income segregation (Bischoff and 
Reardon 2014). Given these cross-metropolitan differences in inequality and segregation, we might expect that 
individuals with the same socioeconomic resources may be embedded in very different social structures, 
depending on where they live. In less economically segregated communities, the poor will likely have better 
access to resource-rich networks, expend fewer resources to build and sustain cross-group ties, and obtain 
greater returns to their social capital investments. As such, I expect residential income segregation to predict 
income biases in social capital investments and collective action, holding all other individual and contextual 
differences constant. 
Data and Method 
To test this hypothesis, I utilize data from the CPS civic and volunteer supplements. The CPS is a monthly survey 
of approximately 56,000 households and is divided into three basic parts: (1) household and demographic 
information, (2) labor force information, and (3) supplement information. Although the main purpose of the CPS 
is to produce monthly labor force estimates, supplemental inquiries cover several different topics. Through the 
civic engagement supplement, the U.S. Census Bureau has collected data on how often individuals engage in a 
number of civic and social activities. Because I am most interested in social capital’s potential for collective 
action, I focus on two proxy measures of social capital: (1) participation in a local organization and (2) reciprocal 
exchange with one’s neighbors. These measures focus on both formal and informal means of social interaction, 
with the assumption that such connections produce the kinds of social capital that make collective action more 
likely. These measures also help me distinguish bonding and bridging social capital. Although I lack data on the 
resources embedded within these networks, I presume that there are more cross-cutting social ties within local 
organizations than there exists between neighbors. In this way, I consider whether the poor living in poor, 
isolated neighborhoods are more likely to rely on their immediate neighbors for help (see, for example, Stack 
1974) than participate in organizations that could possibly provide a more well-connected and politically 
influential base of support and advocacy (see, for example, Green, Tigges, and Browne 1995). 
These measures of social capital come from the 2008 to 2011 civic supplements. I pool these data so that I have 
sufficient sample sizes to compare smaller geographic units. Group membership is a dichotomous measure of 
membership in a school (such as a Parent Teacher Association), religious, sport, neighborhood, or other 
community organization. Approximately 38% of respondents reported involvement in a local organization or 
church. Reciprocal exchange is a 5-point ordinal measure for the frequency that respondents said they do favors 
for their neighbors, ranging from 1 (“never” or “don’t know”) to 5 (“basically every day”). On average, 
respondents reported doing favors for their neighbors once a month. 
Political scientists tend to focus on the collective dimension of social capital—the ways in which interpersonal 
trust and norms of reciprocity make it easier for individuals to come together to pursue their common 
objectives.4 Data from the civic supplements to the CPS do not allow me to directly test whether and where 
social capital facilitates collective action. However, as part of the September volunteer supplement to the CPS, 
the Census asks respondents whether they had “ever worked together informally with someone or some group 
to solve a problem in the community where you live?” (0 = no, 1 = yes). This measure of collective action comes 
from the 2008 to 2011 CPS volunteer supplements.5 On average, less than 10% of respondents reported working 
with others to solve a problem in their community. 
As a first cut at examining geographic variation in the extent to which wealthier residents are more likely to 
engage in these activities than poorer residents, I begin with a simple measure of income bias that compares the 
participation rates of the rich with those of the poor. To ensure sufficient sample sizes per MSA and because of 
limited data for some of the variables used in the full statistical model (detailed below), I restrict my analysis to 
the 30 most populous MSAs. This sample of MSAs provides broad regional coverage and reflects the racial, 
ethnic, and economic diversity of the metropolitan United States. MSA sample sizes range from a minimum of 
2,243 (Columbus, OH) to a maximum of 23,243 (New York City) respondents per MSA (M= 6,499, SD = 4,838). I 
define income bias as the ratio in average response between high- and low-income respondents. Low income is 
defined as those reporting a household income that places them in the bottom third of the income distribution 
in the MSA, and high income is defined as those reporting a household income that places them in the top third 
of the income distribution in the MSA. By using income percentiles for each MSA rather than the national 
income distribution, I account for cost-of-living differences across the country (Wichowsky 2012). 
Consistent with my expectation, income bias is smallest for reciprocal exchange: On average, high- and low-
income respondents reported doing favors for their neighbors at roughly the same rates (M = 1.00, SD = 0.04). In 
contrast, the wealthiest respondents in a metro area are more likely to report membership in a local group than 
the poorest respondents (M = 1.36, SD = 0.14). However, there is also substantial geographic variation in such 
disparities (see Table 1). For example, income bias in group membership (Table 1, Column 1) is nearly 40% larger 
in the Kansas City metropolitan area (1.7) than in the Minneapolis metropolitan area (1.2). Income biases are 
the largest for my measure of collective action: On average, the most advantaged respondents in a metropolitan 
area are nearly two times as likely to report working with others to address neighborhood concerns than the 
least advantaged respondents (M = 2.00, SD = 0.57). Income biases in collective action also vary across the 30 
MSAs. Compare Portland, Oregon, where the rich and poor report working with others to address local 
problems at nearly equal rates, with Cincinnati, Ohio, where the richest third of households are more than three 
and a half times more likely to report such community engagement than the poorest third of households. 
Table 1. Income Biases in Social Capital and Collective Action. 
Metropolitan Area Group Membership Reciprocal Exchange Collective Action 
Atlanta, GA 1.39 0.99 2.59 
Baltimore, MD 1.48 1.04 2.08 
Boston, MA 1.39 1.01 1.50 
Chicago, IL 1.44 1.00 2.28 
Cincinnati, OH 1.39 1.03 3.48 
Cleveland, OH 1.54 0.98 2.37 
Columbus, OH 1.30 1.05 1.34 
Dallas, TX 1.41 0.97 2.18 
Denver, CO 1.41 1.05 2.67 
Detroit, MI 1.33 0.94 1.43 
Houston, TX 1.29 0.96 1.70 
Kansas City, MO 1.71 0.99 1.47 
Los Angeles, CA 1.31 0.98 2.62 
Miami, FL 1.26  1.06 1.71 
Minneapolis–Saint Paul, MN 1.21  0.98 1.26 
New York, NY 1.42  1.04 2.68 
Orlando, FL 1.03  0.89 1.77 
Philadelphia, PA 1.26  1.00 1.72 
Phoenix, AZ 1.59  1.00 3.21 
Pittsburgh, PA 1.44  0.95 1.90 
Portland, OR 1.24  0.98 1.18 
Riverside, CA 1.24  0.95 1.71 
Sacramento, CA 1.46  1.00 1.48 
San Antonio, TX 1.46  1.02 1.62 
San Diego, CA 1.32  1.05 1.94 
San Francisco, CA 1.53  1.01 2.00 
Seattle, WA 1.24  0.99 1.87 
St. Louis, MO 1.37  1.02 1.98 
Tampa, FL 1.18  1.01 1.62 
Washington, D.C. 1.28  1.04 2.74 
Source. CPS Civic Supplements (2008–2011) (Columns 1 and 2) and CPS Volunteer 
Supplements (2008–2011) (Column 3) (Flood et al. 2015). 
Note. Income bias is calculated as the ratio between high- and low-income respondents, 
where low (high) income is defined as having a household income that places individual in 
bottom (top) third of the MSA’s income distribution. CPS = Current Population Survey; MSA 
= metropolitan statistical area. 
 
Table 2 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression that explores this geographic variation 
in greater detail. I regress each measure of income bias on a set of relevant metro-level variables. My 
independent variable of interest is residential income segregation. I consider both the spatial segregation of 
poverty and wealth. These data come from the Pew Research Center’s report on residential income segregation 
for the nation’s top 30 metropolitan areas (Fry and Taylor 2012). Segregation of poverty is defined as the share 
of lower-income households living in a majority lower-income tract. Residents are considered lower income if 
they have a household income that is less than two-thirds the area median household income. Segregation of 
wealth is defined as the share of upper-income households living in a majority upper-income tract. Residents are 
considered upper income if they have a household income more than twice the area median household income. 
These measures are constructed using data from U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) 
five-year file (U.S. Census Bureau 2015) Metropolitan areas with a greater segregation of poverty do tend to 
spatially isolate the wealthy (ρ = .67). Thus, I also consider a third measure reported by Pew that adds these two 
measures together to create a single Residential Income Segregation Index (RISI). 
Table 2. Geographic Variation in Income Biases. 
 RISI   Poverty 
Segregatio
n 























































































































































































































N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Source. CPS Civic Supplements (2008–2011), CPS Volunteer Supplements (2008–2011), American Community 
Survey 2010 5-Year Estimates (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2015) and Pew Research Center (Fry and Taylor 2012). 
Note. Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses. RISI = Residential Income Segregation 
Index; CPS = Current Population Survey. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Income segregation correlates with several other contextual factors, including overall levels of income 
inequality, educational attainment, racial diversity, and population (Bischoff and Reardon 2014). These 
additional controls are included to help insure the results for residential income segregation are not spurious. 
Educational attainment is defined by the share of those 25 years or older with at least a bachelor’s degree. 
Racial diversity is measured by the share of the population that is non-Hispanic White. I log population size to 
correct for the positive skew in population across MSAs. I also control for the poverty rate to account for 
differential social and economic needs across MSAs, as well as the share of the MSA that is foreign-born given 
the positive correlation between income inequality and immigration (Card 2009). These control variables come 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2010 ACS five-year file. 
Critically, I adjust for levels of racial residential segregation using the Black–White Dissimilarity Index (Logan 
2011). In so doing, I isolate the contribution of income segregation from the geographic variation explained 
by racial residential segregation. As discussed above, trends in racial and income segregation have moved in 
opposite directions. Although income and racial segregation are correlated, it is unclear whether racial 
segregation exacerbates income biases in social capital and collective action. For example, non-Hispanic Blacks 
living in predominantly Black neighborhoods tend to have stronger community connections than non-Hispanic 
Blacks living in racially mixed neighborhoods (Gibbons and Yang 2016). 
As shown in Table 2, residential income segregation predicts income biases in social capital investments. Indeed, 
across model specifications, it is the only statistically significant covariate. These aggregate results also suggest 
that such income biases are shaped more by the segregation of poverty than wealth. However, while the 
coefficients on income segregation are all in the expected, positive direction in models predicting the upper-
income skew in collective action, none reach conventional levels of statistical significance. 
Although these analyses suggest geographic variation in income biases in social capital investments, how much 
of this variation reflects compositional differences—that is, differences in individual background and 
resources—versus contextual differences—that is, differences in residential income segregation—is unclear. I 
take advantage of the large number of respondents per MSA to decompose this geographic variation and to test 
whether individual-level income is a stronger predictor of social capital investments and collective action in 
some MSAs compared with others. Because these data have a multilevel structure, with survey respondents 
nested within MSAs, I estimate a multilevel model. The individual-level structural model for social capital 
investments (or collective action) can be written as follows: 
SocialCapital𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1LowIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2HighIncome𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3IncomeMissin𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖
+𝛽𝛽4Age𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5Age𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7Female𝑖𝑖
+𝛽𝛽8Black𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9Hispanic𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10Asian𝑖𝑖
+𝛽𝛽11OtherRace/Ethnicity𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12Unemployed𝑖𝑖
+𝛽𝛽13NotinLaborForce𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽14Children𝑖𝑖 + r𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 ,
 
where Social Capitalij is the measure of social capital for individual, i, living in MSA, j. Each measure of social 
capital is modeled as a function of individual-level covariates (income, age, education, gender, race/ethnicity, 
employment status, and whether the respondent has any children 18 years old or younger) and an individual-
level error term, ri. Race, ethnicity, and employment status are coded such that non-Hispanic Whites and 
employed respondents are the reference groups, respectively. Because income segregation could exacerbate 
income bias in social capital/collective by either depressing the engagement of the poor or increasing the 
engagement of the wealthy (or both), I measure income with two dichotomous measures (low income and high 
income), which are defined as before (i.e., relative to the income distribution of each MSA). The inclusion of 
µj captures unexplained contextual-level variation. 
I model the intercept, αj, which captures the average social capital (or collective action) in an MSA, as a function 
of the covariates used in the aggregate analysis, including residential segregation (both racial and income), racial 
diversity, the share of the population that is foreign-born, poverty, population size, share of the population with 
a college degree, and income inequality (Gini coefficient). The model intercept can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾00 + 𝛾𝛾01%IncomeSegregation𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾02%Non − HispanicWhite𝑖𝑖
+𝛾𝛾03%RacialSegregation𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾04%Foreign − Born𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾05PovertyRate𝑖𝑖
+𝛾𝛾06PopulationSize(log)𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾07%College𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾08IncomeInequality𝑖𝑖.
 
To test my hypothesis that income bias is increasing in income segregation, I allow the coefficients on Low 
Income and High Income to vary as a function of income segregation. Metro areas that are highly segregated by 
income also tend to be more diverse, unequal, and educated places. And as discussed above, it is important to 
distinguish between income and racial segregation. As such, I include the following potential confounding 
factors in the cross-level interaction: racial segregation, income inequality, the share of the population with a 
college degree, and racial diversity.6 For example, the coefficient on Low Income can be rewritten as follows: 
𝛽𝛽1LowIncomei𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾10 + 𝛾𝛾11IncomeSegregation𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾12RacialSegregation𝑖𝑖
+𝛾𝛾13IncomeInequality𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾14%College𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾15%Non − HispanicWhite𝑖𝑖.
 
Multilevel Results 
Table 3 reports results from the multilevel models predicting local organizational membership, reciprocal 
exchange between neighbors, and collective action. Because models that only include individual-level covariates 
show that income is a significant predictor of social capital investments and collective action and that there is a 
significant metro-level variation in the relationship between income and all three dependent variables (see the 
supplemental appendix), I report the fully specified multilevel models in Table 3, focusing on the contextual 
factors that appear to exacerbate these income biases. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































87,459 87,459 87,459 77,134 77,134 77,134 135,232 135,232 135,232 
Source. CPS Civic Supplements (2008–2011), CPS Volunteer Supplements (2008–2011), American Community 
Survey 2010 5-Year Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau 2015) and Pew Research Center (Fry and Taylor 2012). Note. 
Multilevel logistic regression, except Columns 4 to 6 (multilevel regression). Standard errors in parentheses. RISI 
= Residential Income Segregation Index; MSAs = metropolitan statistical areas; CPS = Current Population Survey. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
Consider first whether an individual reports membership in a local organization. Consistent with prior research 
(see, for example, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Putnam 2007), the results suggest that homogeneous 
communities facilitate associational activity: The share of residents who belong to a local group is higher in more 
economically segregated areas and lower in more diverse, unequal, and racially segregated ones. Group 
membership also tends to be higher in places facing greater social needs (as measured by the area’s poverty 
rate) and in more educated and populous metropolitan areas. 
But Columns 1 to 3 also show a deep income divide: Wealthier residents are more likely to report local group 
membership than middle- and low-income residents. Furthermore, the results are consistent with the 
expectation that residential income segregation that cuts the poor off from more resource-rich networks widens 
income biases in social capital investments. The cross-level interactions between Low Income and all three 
measures of income segregation are negative and statistically significant. At the same time, 
however, average local group membership tends to be higher in more economically segregated metros. To see 
how residential income segregation is related to the income bias in local group membership, Figure 1 shows the 
predicted probabilities of group membership for low- and high-income respondents by the extent of income 
segregation in their metro areas. The top (bottom) panel shows the predicted probabilities varying poverty 
(wealth) segregation of an individual’s MSA. In both cases, we see wider income disparities in local group 
membership in more economically segregated metros. To put these differences into context, there was a 12 
percentage point difference, all else equal, in the probability of local group membership between low- and high-
income respondents in the CPS sample. Holding all other individual and contextual differences constant at their 
means, a shift from where the poor are the least to the most segregated is associated with an income gap in 
organizational participation that is roughly one-quarter (3 percentage points) the participation gap between rich 
and poor. Shifting from where the rich are the least to the most segregated is associated with an income gap 
that is roughly half (6 percentage points) the rich–poor difference in the probability of local group membership. 
 
Figure 1. Income bias in associational membership and income segregation. 
Note. Predicted probabilities calculated from coefficients reported in Table 3 for low- and high-income 
respondents. All other covariates held constant at their means. 
 
Income biases also vary as a function of other contextual differences. The positive cross-level interaction 
between High Income and Racial Segregation in Table 3 suggests that the wealthy are even more likely to join 
local groups in racially segregated metropolitan areas. The income gap in group membership also tends to be 
wider in more racially diverse places. On the contrary, this income bias is not as pronounced in more unequal 
MSAs. One possible explanation for this latter finding could be that places with higher levels of income 
inequality have more robust civic sectors. For example, though Sampson (2012) found that many poor 
neighborhoods are at an organizational disadvantage in Chicago, the poor in New York City appear to benefit 
from a more institutionalized nonprofit sector despite the region’s deep income divides (Small 2009). I return to 
the question of whether the nonprofit sector helps to close income gaps by engaging residents across the 
socioeconomic spectrum in the conclusion. 
Income, of course, is not the only individual-level predictor of group membership. Women and parents are more 
likely to report a local group membership. More highly educated respondents are also more likely to make social 
capital investments, while employed respondents, who likely have less time than the unemployed or retired, are 
less likely to do so. 
The next three columns report the results for models predicting the extent to which respondents reported doing 
favors for their neighbors. While the average reciprocal exchange tends to be lower in more racially segregated 
regions, there is much less geographic variation in how often residents engage in this type of informal social 
interaction; no other contextual variable reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. And consistent 
with prior research (see, for example, Briggs 1998; Stack 1974), it is the poor, not the rich, who are most likely to 
invest in social capital that helps them to get by.7 Such income differences, however, do vary across the country. 
Reciprocal exchange among the poor tends to be lower in more educated and unequal metros. Because income 
inequality and educational attainment tend to be higher in more economically prosperous places, it is possible 
that the poor living in these communities have fewer reasons to turn to their neighbors for help. Although the 
cross-level interaction between Low income and Poverty segregation is in the expected direction, it falls just 
short of conventional levels of statistical significance (p = .11). Finally, all else equal, women, parents, and those 
either involuntarily or voluntarily out of the labor force are more likely to report doing favors for their neighbors, 
while racial minorities are less likely to report doing so. 
The last three columns in Table 3 report the results for collective action. Beginning with the average collective 
action in a metro, we see that the share of residents reporting working with others to address local concerns is 
lower in more racially segregated, unequal, and populous metropolitan areas. On average, collective action also 
tends to be lower in metros with larger immigrant populations and higher in more educated and diverse ones. 
Consistent with resource models of political engagement (see, for example, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), 
older and more educated respondents are more likely to report working with others to address local concerns. 
All else equal, parents as well as the unemployed are also more likely to report collective action, while women 
and Hispanics are less likely to do so. 
But although collective action does not appear to increase with income once we condition on other individual- 
and contextual-level covariates, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that there is a greater upper-income 
skew in collective action in metros where the wealthy are more spatially isolated from other residents, as shown 
by the positive and statistically significant cross-level interaction between High Income and Wealth Segregation. 
The cross-level interactions between High Income and the two other measures of income segregation are also in 
the expected directions but are not statistically significant. Thus, it appears that income bias in collective action 
is most sensitive to the spatial segregation of affluence. Holding all other variables constant at their means, 
there is an estimated 1.1 percentage point difference in the likelihood of collective action among the rich 
between the least and most segregated regions. Because collective action is rare—less than 10% of the CPS 
sample reports working with others to address local concerns—substantive differences are smaller in 
magnitude. All else equal, the rich are a little more than 2 percentage points more likely to report working with 
others to address local concerns compared with their poorer neighbors. As shown in Figure 2, a shift from the 
least to the most segregated region is associated with an increase in income bias that is nearly half the rich–poor 
gap in collective action. 
 
Figure 2. Income bias in collective action and income segregation. 
Note. Predicted probabilities calculated from coefficients reported in Table 3 for low- and high-income 
respondents. All other covariates held constant at their means. 
 
One outstanding question is how the likelihood of participating in local civic life is shaped by the intersection 
between race and income segregation. Although income segregation, particularly the spatial isolation of the 
wealthy, increased quite dramatically between 1970 and 2010 (Fry and Taylor 2012), racial segregation remains 
persistently high, despite slight declines over the same time period (Massey, Rothwell, and Domina 2009). My 
previous analyses suggest that income segregation exacerbates income biases in the likelihood that individuals 
join local groups and work with others to address neighborhood concerns. In addition, I show that racial 
segregation is associated with a lower likelihood of group membership among the poor. But does income 
segregation also widen racial disparities in social capital and collective action? Low-income African-Americans 
are much more likely to live in concentrated poor neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993; Sharkey 2013) and 
over the last 30 years have become more isolated from middle- and high-income African-Americans (Bischoff 
and Reardon 2014). Poor Black households are also more likely to experience the correlates of segregation, 
including older dilapidated housing stock and chronic joblessness (Lichter, Parisi, and de Valk 2016); they remain 
the most vulnerable to the spatial segregation of poverty and the economic and civic isolation it brings. 
To consider the possibility that income segregation widens racial disparities, I reestimate the multilevel models 
by allowing the slope on Black to vary as a function of Poverty segregation and including the additional cross-
level interactions as before (racial segregation, income inequality, racial diversity, and share of the population 
with a college degree). 
The coefficients and standard errors for these cross-level interactions are shown in Table 4. First, consider the 
likelihood of belonging to a local organization. All else equal, non-Hispanic Blacks are significantly less likely to 
report group membership than non-Hispanic Whites. This racial gap is even more pronounced in more racially 
segregated metropolitan areas, as shown by the negative and statistically significant cross-level interaction 
between Black and Racial segregation, and less so in more unequal and less diverse metros. I find no evidence 
that poverty segregation is associated with a larger racial gap in local group membership. 











































Note. Multilevel models also include the same individual- and contextual-level covariates in Table 3. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
In contrast, however, non-Hispanic Blacks living in metros where the poor are more spatially isolated 
are lesslikely to report doing favors for their neighbors, and are more likely to do so in metros where non-
Hispanic Blacks and non-Hispanic Whites are more segregated from one another.8 
Finally, though the coefficient on the cross-level interaction with Poverty segregation is also negative in the 
model predicting collective action, it fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Rather, non-
Hispanic Blacks are more likely to report collective action in racially segregated metros and less likely to do so in 
more unequal and educated metros. Thus, although racial and income segregation are moderately correlated (ρ 
= .39), these results point to an analytical distinction between the two as they relate to racial differences in 
bonding social capital and collective action. 
Discussion 
Urban civic life presents several contrasts. New civic technologies have made it easier for residents to get 
informed, communicate their preferences, and hold public officials accountable. A large and growing local 
nonprofit sector has helped to underwrite an increase in volunteering (Smith 2011). Some scholars have even 
argued that cities are best positioned to rescue democracy from the sclerotic and ideologically polarized nation-
state (see, for example, Barber 2013; Katz and Bradley 2013). But turnout in local elections remains anemic and 
often results in quite uneven consideration of political interests (see, for example, Anzia 2011). Many cities 
continue to struggle to improve police–community relations, which as Lerman and Weaver (2014)demonstrated 
in their study of “stop-and-frisk” in New York City may also chill local citizen engagement, particularly in 
majority–minority neighborhoods. As Trounstine (2010, p. 419) noted, “We do not yet have a firm sense of how 
well local democracy functions, the conditions under which it functions well, or what ‘well’ means.” Although 
fully addressing these questions is beyond the scope of this article, I draw on social capital theory to examine 
geographic variation in associational membership, neighborly behavior, and collective action, and test whether 
residential income segregation is associated with greater income disparities in civic life. 
Consistent with previous research, I find that context matters, even after taking into account important 
individual-level resource differences. Residential income segregation is associated with larger income divides in 
social capital investments and collective action. In both the aggregate and multilevel models, wealthier residents 
were more likely to be overrepresented in organizational life in places marked by a greater spatial segregation of 
poverty. And once I account for compositional and contextual differences across metros, the spatial segregation 
of wealth was associated with a larger rich–poor gap in local group membership. I also find that residential 
income segregation is associated with a higher-income skew in collective action: Wealthy respondents are even 
more likely to report working with others to solve neighborhood problems when their neighbors are also 
socioeconomically advantaged. These results are robust to the inclusion of other confounders, including racial 
context, income inequality, and racial residential segregation. Finally, I show that non-Hispanic Blacks report 
fewer reciprocal exchanges with neighbors in metros where the poor are more spatially isolated from middle- 
and high-income residents. 
Whether such divides also have political consequence remains to be seen. For example, future research could 
consider whether residential income segregation—particularly the spatial isolation of affluence—is related to 
the willingness of wealthier residents to invest in public goods that benefit poor communities. And though I 
show that income biases in local group membership tend to be larger in more economically segregated metros, I 
have provided a bird’s-eye view of the extent to which social capital investments vary within and between 
metropolitan areas. Teasing out how residential income segregation shapes opportunities to build cross-cutting 
networks is an area for future study. Previous research on school reform efforts in Baltimore illustrates how 
networks that bridge class, race, and ethnic divides, particularly at the “elite level of sociopolitical organization,” 
are difficult to build and sustain in disadvantaged and racially segregated communities (Orr 1999, p. 8). Gibbons 
(2015) found that CBOs are more territorial in racially segregated communities and thus seek to protect their 
turf (e.g., funding, political support) from organizations in other neighborhoods. Gibbons’s study highlights the 
need to study the entire ecosystem of CBOs—their connections to other organizations, neighborhoods, funders, 
and local politicians—to fully understand how CBOs act as “civic intermediaries” (LeRoux 2007), and whether in 
doing so they help to bridge socioeconomic divides by creating opportunities for the poor to share social space 
with more advantaged residents. Furthermore, these results point to a key role that foundations, nonprofits, 
and community organizers could play to facilitate region-wide discussions about income segregation and to build 
regional alliances that address the disparities between poor and affluent neighborhoods (see, for 
example, Pastor, Benner, and Matsuoka 2009). 
My findings suggest that residential income segregation constrains the extent to which the poor can use their 
social capital to overcome their relative socioeconomic disadvantages. Nevertheless, I raise three additional 
limitations to this study. The first is that I am unable to establish a causal relationship between income 
segregation and income biases in social capital and collective action. Panel data that span long enough time 
periods to examine changes within metropolitan areas may provide greater leverage on causality. Second, these 
findings only speak to the 30 most populous metropolitan areas in the country. On one hand, this provides an 
analytic advantage given the substantial differences between large and small metro areas that may not be fully 
captured by the control variables; however, whether these relationships hold among small- and medium-sized 
metros is unknown. Finally, though the CPS measure of collective action comes closer to functional definitions of 
social capital (Coleman 1988), my measures of social capital investments provide little insight into the resources 
embedded within the network of relationships or whether such relationships help poorer residents meet their 
needs and achieve their interests. Until better instruments are available in large-N surveys, case studies may 
offer greater leverage on these questions. But for community activists, elected officials, and local bureaucrats 
interested in increasing neighborhood civic capacities, these results suggest that the growing spatial segregation 
of the rich and poor deserves more attention. 
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Notes 
1.Social capital can also be unproductive, reinforcing prejudices, constraining individual freedoms, and 
incentivizing free riding. 
2.I reference these studies with the usual caveat distinguishing correlation from causation. 
3.I thank one of my anonymous reviewers for emphasizing this point. 
4.In 2011, the Current Population Survey (CPS) added a measure of social trust to the civic supplement. Future 
work could examine whether income biases in social trust are similarly conditioned by income 
segregation. 
5.Although there are more volunteer supplements than civic supplements, I restrict the time frames to be 
consistent between the two datasets. 
6.Substantive findings remain largely the same in models that exclude these additional confounding variables in 
the cross-level interactions (see Table A3 in the supplemental appendix). 
7.This curvilinear relationship between income and reciprocal exchange is also present in models that exclude 
contextual covariates (see Table A2 in the supplemental appendix). 
8.Although poverty segregation and racial segregation are correlated, multicollinearity is not a problem; poverty 
segregation remains negatively correlated with reciprocal exchange in a model that excludes racial 
segregation from the cross-level interaction (p < .05). 
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